Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal Production Systems by Hennessy, David A. et al.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
6-2004
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open
and Closed Animal Production Systems
David A. Hennessy
Iowa State University, hennessy@iastate.edu
Jutta Roosen
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
Helen H. Jensen
Iowa State University, hhjensen@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Industrial Organization Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hennessy, David A.; Roosen, Jutta; and Jensen, Helen H., "Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal
Production Systems" (2004). CARD Working Papers. 402.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/402
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed Animal
Production Systems
Abstract
Comparative advantage motivates large trade flows in feeder animals throughout the world. Trade creates
externalities when animal diseases can spread beyond the purchasing farm. When growers can choose
between open and closed production systems, Nash equilibrium will likely involve socially excessive trading.
Supply response to an increase in marginal costs may be positive. While first-best involves marketwide
adoption of either an open-trade or closed-farm system, equilibrium may entail heterogeneous systems. If this
is the case, then the feeder trade should be banned. Within a farm, we show how risk of infectious disease can
create decreasing returns to scale when the technology is otherwise increasing in returns to scale. Control of
disease risk through bilateral contracts or damage-control technologies will increase scale of production in
fattening, while better sorting in feeder animal markets will have ambiguous effects on scale.
Keywords
feeder trade, industrialization, information, Nash equilibrium, vertical integration, welfare, food safety
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Industrial Organization | Public Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/402
 
 
 
 
Infectious Disease, Productivity, and Scale in Open and Closed  
Animal Production Systems 
 
 
David A. Hennessy, Jutta Roosen, and Helen H. Jensen 
 
 
Working Paper 04-WP 367 
July 2004 
 
 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
David Hennessy and Helen Jensen are professors in the Department of Economics and the Cen-
ter for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University. Jutta Roosen is a professor 
in the Department of Food Economics and Consumption Studies, University of Kiel.  
 
The authors appreciate funding from the USDA (NRI Grant 416-45-12). Comments from Hongli 
Feng, Joachim Krieter, and Edgar Schallenberger are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
This paper is available online on the CARD Web site: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is 
granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the authors. 
 
For questions or comments about the contents of this paper, please contact David Hennessy, 
578C Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, 50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-6171; Fax: 515-
294-6336; E-mail: hennessy@iastate.edu. 
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, gender, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status. (Not all prohibited 
bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information 
(Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD). To file a complaint 
of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th and Independence Avenue, 
SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, 
sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran. Any persons having inquiries concerning this may 
contact the Director of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, 1350 Beardshear Hall, 515-294-7612. 
  
Abstract 
Comparative advantage motivates large trade flows in feeder animals throughout   
the world. Trade creates externalities when animal diseases can spread beyond the 
purchasing farm. When growers can choose between open and closed production 
systems, Nash equilibrium will likely involve socially excessive trading. Supply response 
to an increase in marginal costs may be positive. While first-best involves marketwide 
adoption of either an open-trade or closed-farm system, equilibrium may entail 
heterogeneous systems. If this is the case, then the feeder trade should be banned. Within 
a farm, we show how risk of infectious disease can create decreasing returns to scale 
when the technology is otherwise increasing in returns to scale. Control of disease risk 
through bilateral contracts or damage-control technologies will increase scale of 
production in fattening, while better sorting in feeder animal markets will have 
ambiguous effects on scale. 
 
Keywords: feeder trade, industrialization, information, Nash equilibrium, vertical inte-
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INFECTIOUS DISEASE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND SCALE IN  
OPEN AND CLOSED ANIMAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
In December 2003, a Washington State dairy cow was identified as having bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy. The cow had originally entered the United States in an 81-
animal shipment from Canada. An investigation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) into what ultimately happened to this shipment concluded after accounting for 
only 29 animals (APHIS 2004). Recent inquiries by Skaggs et al. (2004) into the subse-
quent histories of Mexican live cattle imports to the United States also point to data in-
adequacies. These cases give testimony to the openness of bovine agriculture in North 
America and to the information problems this openness can generate. Tables 1 and 2 
summarize the extent of internal flows (United States) and international flows of some of 
the main husbanded species.  
Today, world trade is significantly larger than it was in the 1970s. For pigs, U.S. 
domestic and international flows have increased markedly since 1990. There are many 
reasons for these flows, including policy motives, regional economic growth patterns, and 
cultural issues. One important reason is that animal feed requirements change with ani-
mal maturity. Feed is bulky, and it is often more profitable to move young animals closer 
to the feed source rather than transport the feed. In recent years, U.S. feeder pigs have 
tended to move from the Atlantic South (North Carolina) and Canada to be fattened in the 
Corn Belt. Feeder cattle tend to move from the sparse West to the Midwest and Great 
Plains (Shields and Matthews 2003). There are also specialist trades in replacement dairy 
cows, poultry chicks, and laying hens. These animal flows are subject to some regula-
tions, in large part because of disease risks that affect productivity and sometimes may 
affect human health.  
Our main thesis in this paper is that openness matters in the presence of communica-
ble diseases. We address two related issues having to do with the extent of openness in 
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TABLE 1. Internal (state-to-state) shipments of live animals—United  States 
Item 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 2002 
 (Million Head) 
Cattle 13.5 22.9 20.0 22.5 21.8 
Pigs 2.5 3.2 4.6 3.6 26.9 
Sheep 6.1 4.0 2.2 2.2 1.5 
Source: Shields and Mathews 2003. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Exports of live animals—world 
Item 1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 2002 
 (Million Head) 
Cattle 4.9 6.7 7.1 8.0 8.3 8.8 
Pigs 2.6 4.6 10.5 12.9 15.5 17.0 
Sheep 6.5 8.5 16.4 19.0 17.1 18.4 
Goats 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.0 3.1 2.6 
Chickens 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 
Turkeys 0.0 0.003 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Source: FAO, Agricultural Data, Agriculture and Food Trade, April 2004. 
 
animal production systems. We provide a simple formal model of the tension between 
regional comparative advantage as a motive for animal trade and efficiency losses due to 
higher incidence of infectious diseases under open trade. The model characterizes the 
Nash equilibrium (NE) set and provides suggestions on when it would be socially optimal 
to regulate the feeder animal trade. There can be a unique equilibrium or multiple stable 
equilibria, depending on how the extent of infection affects the productivity of the closed 
system relative to the open system. Supply response to a cost increase can be positive. In 
our model, too, it is optimal to restrict trade whenever market equilibrium comprises a 
mix of open and closed system farms. 
We then turn to the consequences of sourcing, sorting, and disease husbandry deci-
sions for efficiency and scale in fattening. We find that the risk of realizing a communica-
ble disease within a feedlot discourages the exploitation of technical economies of scale. 
But the relationship between scale and animal health class may not be monotone, a conse-
quence of interanimal dependencies when animals infect each other. These dependencies 
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also motivate sorting in feeder animal markets. Contracts to procure animals through pri-
vate parties, rather than through open market sourcing, will likely decrease systemic dis-
ease risk and increase production scale. In addition, the model allows us to conclude that a 
ban on a damage-control input may decrease lot scale. After providing case studies of man-
aging communicable animal disease, the paper concludes with a brief discussion. 
 
Animal Movements and Communicable Disease Externalities 
Countries coordinate efforts to eradicate diseases that pose the most significant threats 
to animal production systems and human health (Otte, Nugent, and McLeod 2004). Table 3 
summarizes some of the more important transboundary animal diseases. Institutions in-
volved in global efforts to control communicable animal diseases include public veterinary 
services at the national and regional levels, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
of the United Nations, and the Office International des Épizooties (OIE).  
To be successful in eradicating an infectious disease, the most effective strategy is 
often to cull all herds with infected animals, leave the production facilities idle for a suf-
ficiently long duration, and strictly observe herds in a given radius around an infected 
farm. Controls often include forbidding transportation of animals from the farm and re-
stricting trade with a region or country. Human travel may also be discouraged, perhaps 
by denying permission to hold sports events, animal fairs, cultural events, and elections. 
Because events surrounding outbreaks of diseases (listed in Table 3) can directly affect 
the daily lives of whole societies, outbreaks are widely reported. Many other infectious 
animal diseases that are not as widely publicized also cause considerable economic 
losses. There are several ways in which animal diseases affect the productivity of a herd. 
Apart from mortality, depressed productivity may lead to low feed conversion efficiency, 
reproductive losses, poor product quality, early culling of breeding and dairy stock, and 
reduced efficiency of management effort. 
The formal economics literature on animal disease externalities is sparse. Most stud-
ies have been done in the field of veterinary science and consist in estimating the cost of 
production losses due to a disease. An early FAO (1962) study estimated that losses due 
to disease amounted to 15 percent of total livestock output in developed countries and 30 
percent in less-developed countries. A study of health and fertility problems in dairying
  
TABLE 3. Important transboundary animal diseases and recent outbreaks 
Disease 
Affected Species 
and Countries Epidemiology/Transmission 
Economic Impact  
(actual outbreak values) 
Foot-and-Mouth     
Disease 
Cloven-hoofed 
livestock; 
Europe, 
South-
America, Asia
Highly contagious virus. Spread by movement 
of infected animals, animal products, con-
taminated objects, and wind. Vaccination 
complicated because of multiple virus traits 
and loss of disease-free status. 
February 2001, UK: cost $3.6-
$11.6 billiona 
1997, Philippines: Direct costs $25 
millionb 
Bovine          
Spongiform     
Encephalopathy 
Cattle; Europe, 
Japan, North 
America 
Prion disease. Link to new-variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Likely transmis-
sion through inclusion of infected animals 
in feed. 
Since mid-1980s, UK: Overall 
losses: $5.8 billiona 
Classical              
Swine Fever 
Pigs; Europe, 
South Asia, 
Latin America
Virus. Effects vary from subclinical to sudden 
death. Transmission by feed, respiration, 
semen, and manure spreading. 
1997-98, Netherlands: Short-term 
costs $23 millionc 
Newcastle            
Disease 
Birds Virus. Primarily spread from bird to bird but 
also through contaminated feed, water, and 
clothing. 
2000, Mexico: Major outbreak, 
13.6 million birds were de-
stroyedd 
Avian Influenza Poultry; out-
breaks in 
Asia, Ameri-
cas, Europe 
Highly lethal virus. Probably ubiquitous in 
wild waterfowl. Wide range of disease 
symptoms, ranging from mild to severe. 
1999-2001, Italy: 13 million birds 
killed. Also Asia (1997-98, 2003, 
2004), Netherlands (2003)e 
a Mathews and Buzby 2001.   
b Perry et al. 1999.    
c Horst et al. 1999. 
d Otte, Nugent, and McLeod 2004. 
e World Health Organization 2004.
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(Dijkhuizen 1990) assessed losses equal to 10 percent of gross production value. Bennett 
(2003) estimated the annual value of output loss and input expenditure with treatment and 
prevention costs for 30 diseases of livestock in Great Britain at about 3.2 percent of the 
value of animal production. 
McInerney (1996) developed a model that recognizes that the cost of disease is a 
composite loss due to disease and cost of treatment. Animal diseases are modeled in the 
primal production function as lowering the productivity index, and we follow this ap-
proach. The model has been applied in the study of controlling infectious disease on dairy 
farms in Canada by Chi et al. (2002). A limitation for policy purposes is that these mod-
els do not address the role of disease externalities, namely, the divergence between pri-
vate and public consequences of actions.1 This is important because if equilibrium is to 
be understood in the presence of contagion then one must establish when private actions 
are consistent with the actions of others. Economic inquiries into control of infectious 
diseases among humans have related equilibrium rates of infection under selfish behavior 
to economic policies (Geoffard and Philipson 1996, 1997; Kremer 1996). However, their 
models provide little guidance for animal health maintenance because humans are not 
traded and are largely free to behave as they will. 
Empirical models to simulate the spread of contagious transboundary diseases in-
clude McCauley et al. (1979); Mangen, Nielsen, and Burrell (2002); Matthews et al. 
(2003); Mintiens et al. (2003); and Schoenbaum and Disney (2003). While useful in fore-
casting the spread of disease and analyzing the effectiveness of different intervention 
strategies, these models do not directly recognize the decision problem at the farm 
level—that private incentives must be in place to promote private decisions that are in the 
public interest.2 To close the gap that exists in the disease literature, we develop a simple 
model that provides insight into regulating communicable animal diseases. 
 
Model 
Two types of commercial animal production systems exist. These are a closed (inte-
grated) system that fattens animals from birth, and an open (specialist) system in which 
feeder animals are produced at one location and fattened at a second. Both systems in-
volve a continuum of competitive firms that produce fattened animals who are at risk for 
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contracting a communicable chronic disease that reduces output. There is free entry from 
a large pool of potential producers and each producing firm has unit capacity. Fraction 
[0,1]µ∈  of producing firms uses an open system while the residual uses a closed system. 
We will model the closed and open systems in turn. 
Closed System 
In the closed system, it costs fec  to produce each feeder animal internally and fac  to 
fatten the animal. A chronic disease affecting productivity and mean output for a firm in 
the closed system is [ ] [0,1]G I ∈ , where [0,1]I ∈  is an index of disease severity. In order 
to capture the consequences of animal congestion for the spread of disease in a region, 
disease severity is assumed to be strictly increasing in the region’s output, Q . Disease 
severity is also assumed to be strictly increasing in the fraction of firms that produces 
under the open system. Thus, disease severity index ( , ) : [0,1] [0,1]I Qµ +× →\  is con-
tinuously differentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments.3  In addition, [ ]G I  is 
continuously differentiable with [ ] 0IG I <  to capture productivity losses. Closed-system 
mean profit per unit capacity is  
 [ ] ,cs fe faPG I c cπ = − −  (1) 
where P  is the product market price. The market demand function is ( )P Q  with 
( ) 0QP Q < . The number of producing firms adjusts to match supply with demand. 
Open System 
In the open system it costs w  to procure a feeder animal. Procurement may be in the 
spot market, perhaps by live auction where feeder animals from a large number of farms 
mingle. Procurement may also be by bilateral contract. Inequality few c<  is assumed so 
that specialization efficiencies could give rise to trade opportunities. It costs fac  to fatten 
the animal, as in the closed system. Product sells for the same price, but disease losses 
differ relative to the closed system. Mean yield on a given open-system farm is [ ] 0H I >  
where [ ]H I  has the same analytic properties as [ ]G I . In addition, 
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[ ] [ ] [0,1]H I G I I< ∀ ∈  because the open system is more exposed to communicable dis-
ease risk. Open-system mean profit per unit capacity is 
 [ ] ,os faPH I w cπ = − −  (2) 
where product price is as under the closed system and free entry balances supply with 
demand. 
Competition and Equilibrium 
The context is an infinite-player, two-strategy game in which the growers choose be-
tween closed-system and open-system procurement. The respective payoffs are as given 
in equations (1) and (2). We consider only pure strategy NE because a non-trivial, mixed 
strategy will always be dominated by a pure strategy. 
Equilibrium may be described as a pair * *{ , }Pµ  subject to * 0P >  and * [0,1]µ ∈ . 
The market-level output consistent with *P  is *Q  and equilibrium can alternatively be 
described as * *{ , }Qµ . Equilibrium incidence of disease is * * *( , )I I Qµ= . There is free 
entry to each system so that economic profits are null, that is, 0csπ ≤  and 0osπ ≤ , where 
one weak inequality is an equality if production occurs. These conditions can be stated as  
 * ** *; ;[ ] [ ]
fe fa facs osc c w cP P P P
G I H I
+ +≤ ≡ ≤ ≡  (3) 
with at least one an equality. Define  
 [ ]; [ ] ,
[ ]
fe fa
fa
c c G IM I
w c H I
θ += =+  (4) 
where 1θ >  is assured. Expression θ  may be thought of as the ratio of internal private 
production costs to external private production costs. 
If profits are to be equal across systems, and both are equal to zero given free entry, 
then θ =  *[ ]M I . For zero profits, too, the law of demand requires that both 
* *( ) ( ) / [ ]fe faP Q c c G I= +  and * *( ) ( ) / [ ]faP Q w c H I= +  where 1( )P− ⋅  is the inverse de-
mand function. Summarizing, label the three conditions as  
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 * * 1 * 1* *1: [ ]; 2 : ; 3: .[ ] [ ]
fe fa fac c w cL M I L Q P L Q P
G I H I
θ − −+ +   = = =        (5) 
Only two of L1-L3 are independent, and any two solve to identify an equilibrium pair 
* *{ , }Pµ  with associated market quantity *Q . Our conditions on [ ]M ⋅  do not require that 
there be a unique solution to L1 on the domain of I . Notice that 1L  is free of the demand 
function. Consequently, it is sometimes convenient to study 1L  and one of 2L  or 3L  
rather than the pair 2L  and 3L . 
Characterizing Equilibrium 
To better understand where L1-L3 could intersect, differentiate each in variables Q  
and µ : 
 1 2 3| 0; | 0; | 0.
I I
L L L
Q Q I Q Q IQ
I G I H
IdQ dQ dQG H
P I G P I Hd I d d
P G P H
µ µ
µ
µ µ µ= − < = − < = − <+ +
 (6) 
Furthermore, at any given point ( , )Qµ , / 0QP P < , and so 
 1 2 1 3| | , | | .L L L L
dQ dQ dQ dQ
d d d dµ µ µ µ< <  (7) 
This means that if, say, 1L  (for a given value of *I ) and 2L  cross at all, then they cross 
just once. Comparing the two zero profit curves, we have 2 3( / ) | ( ) ( / ) |L LdQ d dQ dµ µ≥ ≤  if  
 Ln( [ ]) Ln( [ ])( ) ,
Ln( ) Ln( )
d G I d H I
d I d I
≤ ≥  (8) 
that is, the elasticity of production with respect to disease severity in the closed system is 
less (greater) than that in the open system. 
An example is provided in Figure 1, where a single crossing point exists (all three 
curves must cross there) and this NE crossover point is at * *( , )Qµ . In it we have made  
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FIGURE 1. Heterogeneous system equilibrium 
 
the assumption that 2 3( / ) | ( / ) |L LdQ d dQ dµ µ≤ . Point (0, )GQ  is the point on 2L  such 
that 0µ = , while (1, )HQ  is the point on 3L  such that 1µ = .  
A concern with understanding Figure 1 is whether the solution is unique, stable, and 
interior. There may not be an interior solution *I  to equation L1; there may be multiple 
solutions; and a solution may not be locally stable, that is, robust to a local perturbation. 
Suppose first that θ <  [ ( , )] ( , ) 2M I Q Q Lµ µ∀ ∈ . Then no firm would ever have a private 
incentive to choose the open system and so equilibrium requires * 0µ = . Under free en-
try, market output must be GQ , the unique solution to * *( ) [ (0, )] fe faP Q G I Q c c= + . Sup-
pose instead that [ ( , )] ( , ) 2M I Q Q Lθ µ µ> ∀ ∈  and no firm would ever have a private 
incentive to choose the closed system. Then * 1µ =  and market output must be HQ , the 
unique solution to * *( ) [ (1, )] faP Q H I Q w c= + .  
 
PROPOSITION 1. (a) If [ ( , )] ( , ) 2M I Q Q Lθ µ µ< ∀ ∈ , then the unique NE is 
* *( , ) (0, )GQ Qµ = .  
(b) If [ ( , )] ( , ) 2M I Q Q Lθ µ µ> ∀ ∈ , then the unique NE is * *( , ) (1, )HQ Qµ = . 
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Now consider when there is at least one solution to L1. Suppose [ ]M ⋅  is locally in-
creasing in I  and a perturbation to an *I  renders the perturbed value of I  to be too large 
to satisfy L1. Then, [ ]M I θ>  and firms deviate to the more profitable closed system so 
that the value of µ  decreases. This does indeed reduce the level of infection so that one 
can iterate toward equilibrium. Suppose instead that [ ]M ⋅  is decreasing and a perturba-
tion to an *I  renders the perturbed value of I  to be too large to satisfy L1 as [ ]M I θ< . 
By L1, firms deviate to the more profitable open system, µ  increases, and the infection 
index becomes larger. So only locally stable equilibria occur where [ ]M ⋅  is increasing.  
Assume that only isolated points solve [ ] 0IM I = .4 Assign solutions to [ ]M I θ=  
such that [ ]M I θ−  does not change sign locally as unstable.5 Define the set of stable 
solutions to [ ]M I θ=  as *( , )S M θ . Denote condition [ (0, )]GM I Q θ<  as C1. The condi-
tion ensures that when all firms are closed, then there is strictly positive profit under the 
open system and so (0, )GQ  cannot be NE. If [ (0, )]GM I Q θ>  then assert that C2 ap-
plies. Similarly, denote condition [ (1, )]HM I Q θ>  as C3. When all firms are open and 
C3 applies, then there is strictly positive profit under the closed system and so (1, )HQ  
cannot be NE either. If [ (1, )]HM I Q θ<  then assert that C4 applies. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.  Under conditions  
(a) C1 and C3, then the set of stable NE is  
* * * * * *{{ , ( ) / [ ( , )]}: ( , ) ( , )}fe fac c G I Q Q S Mµ µ µ θ+ ∈ . 
(b) C1 and C4, then the set of stable NE is as in (a) in union with 
{1, ( ) / [ (1, )]}Hfaw c H I Q+ . 
(c) C2 and C3, then the set of stable NE is as in (a) in union with 
{0, ( ) / [ (0, )]}Gfe fac c G I Q+ . 
(d) C2 and C4, then the set of stable NE is as in (b) in union with 
{0, ( ) / [ (0, )]}Gfe fac c G I Q+ . 
Under part (a), only interior equilibria result. Given that [ ]G I  and [ ]H I  are strictly 
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positive and continuous, ratio [ ]M I  must be too. As C1 and C3 require that [ ]M I θ−  
changes sign, continuity ensures there is at least one crossing from below as µ  changes 
so that a stable equilibrium exists. Under part (b), there is no guarantee that a crossing 
occurs at all so that part (b) in Proposition 1 could apply. With part (c), it may be that no 
crossing occurs either and then part (a) of Proposition 1 applies. With part (d), a crossing 
occurs and at least one crossing point has negative value for [ ]IM I . In that situation, we 
cannot rule out either the polar market-wide closed system or the polar market-wide open 
system. The situation where the only stable equilibria are these two polar cases is of par-
ticular interest, and we will return to it. 
Concerning interior solutions, notice that / 0fed dcθ > , / 0d dwθ < , and 
/ 0fad dcθ < . Remembering that 0IM >  for a locally stable equilibrium, Figure 2 illus-
trates the effect of an increase in the value of w  on curve 1L  and thus on equilibrium. In 
general, one can assert the following. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.  For any element of * * * * * *{{ , ( ) / [ ( , )]}: ( , ) ( , )}fe fac c G I Q Q S Mµ µ µ θ+ ∈ ,  
(a) *µ  is increasing in fec . Equilibrium product price is increasing in fec . 
(b) *µ  is decreasing in w  and fac . Equilibrium product price is decreasing in w  and fac . 
 
The most noteworthy effects are the positive supply responses to increasing costs in 
part (b). The rationale is as follows. An increase in the internalized relative cost of the 
open system elicits a shift toward the closed system, a decrease in equilibrium disease 
incidence, enhanced productivity for all firms, and an increase in market output.  
An interesting situation arises when [ ]M I  is strictly decreasing on the domain of I  
while [ (0, )] [ (1, )]G HM I Q M I Qθ> > . Then there are two stable NE: either all firms use 
the open system or all use the closed system. In this case, an increase in w  (e.g., a per-
head tax at barn auction sales) either has no effect or it causes a discrete switch from solu-
tion {1, ( ) / [ (1, )]}Hfaw c H I Q+  to solution {0, ( ) / [ (0, )]}Gfe fac c G I Q+ . The switchover  
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FIGURE 2. Increase in purchase cost shifts stable equilibria northwest 
occurs when * ( ) / [ (1, )]HfaP w c H I Q= +  ( ) / [ (1, )]Hfe fac c G I Q= +  and w  then increases 
infinitesimally. But use equation (7) for different values of I  to conclude that 
[ (0, )] [ (1, )]G HG I Q G I Q> , so that a discrete decrease in the value of *P  occurs. 
 
PROPOSITION 4.  Suppose [ (0, )] [ (1, )]G HM I Q M I Qθ> >  and [ ]M I  is strictly decreasing. 
Then any change in (stable) equilibrium in response to an increase in either w  or fac  (or 
a decrease in fec ) involves a shift of all finishers from the open system to the closed sys-
tem, a discrete increase in market output, and a discrete decrease in product price. 
 
Proposition 4 raises the possibility that a rapid change in the structure of animal produc-
tion arises from a modest change in the price environment. The elasticity condition that 
/IH H >  /IG G  on the domain of I  (see relation [8] above) is neither intuitive nor unduly 
restrictive. Proposition 4 also motivates the idea of a disease eradication program in which 
movement controls temporarily raise unit cost w  toward infinity until a new equilibrium is 
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established. Indeed, in an ideal world, after a disease has been eradicated one could trade 
and still achieve output [ 0]G I = . Unfortunately, our model attaches system openness status 
to a production function and so we cannot pursue the idea of eradication in a formal manner.  
Welfare 
As the NE settled upon is not necessarily optimal when multiple equilibria exist, our 
interest in this section is to establish how to arrive at a superior equilibrium. To under-
stand the equilibrium sought, note that, under free entry, fatteners receive no economic 
surplus. All surplus accrues to consumers, and so social surplus increases in equilibrium 
output *Q . In addition, even if (0, )GQ  is not an NE, it is preferred to any interior NE 
because equation (6) ensures that market output has to be larger when all firms are 
closed.  
 
PROPOSITION 5.  (a) If (0, )GQ  is an NE, then it is the NE that supports the largest surplus. 
(b) If there exists any interior NE, i.e., * (0,1)µ ∈  be it stable or unstable, then it is wel-
fare improving to ban the feeder trade. 
 
The prescription to ban trade should not be taken literally. The real issue is the de-
gree of openness of the market-level production system. Quarantine laws and other 
movement controls are intermediate approaches to reducing system openness. In addition, 
an information system can be viewed as a substitute for movement controls. 
A concern that remains is to characterize when the open system is optimal. This is 
true whenever H GQ Q> . Define Hw w=  such that H GQ Q= , i.e., ( ) ( )H GP Q P Q=  so 
that  
 [ (1, )]( ) .
[ (0, )]
H
H
fe fa faH
H I Qw c c c
G I Q
= + −  (9) 
If Hw w< , then equation (6) assures that the unique equilibrium is (1, )HQ . Because 
H GQ Q>  under this value of w , this equilibrium is also first-best. We have already 
shown that no intermediate NE is optimum. 
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PROPOSITION 6.  If Hw w< , then equilibrium is efficient. If Hw w≥ , then any tax τ  on 
trade in feeder animals such that fec wτ > −  supports the first-best equilibrium (0, )GQ . 
 
Figure 3 depicts when the feeder trade is both optimal and the unique NE. At that 
point, w  is sufficiently low so that the least value of Q  on the closed-system zero-profit 
line 3L  (i.e., HQ ) exceeds the greatest value of Q  on the open-system zero-profit line 
2L  (i.e., GQ ). If H GQ Q<  instead, then (1, )HQ  cannot be the unique NE and (0, )GQ  is 
first-best. 
 
Internal Management of Communicable Disease Risk 
In addition to inter-farm disease externalities, there are also intra-farm communica-
ble disease problems. In order to understand better the economics of intra-farm commu-
nicable disease problems, we will ignore inter-farm externalities for the remainder of the 
paper. The central trade-off will be between technical scale economies in fattening and 
the risk in large feedlots that some animal may cause lot-wide damage. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. When feeder trade is optimal, unique equilibrium occurs 
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Our basic template in modeling firm-level production under communicable disease 
risk is Kremer’s (1993) O-ring production function. Ignoring disease costs for the mo-
ment, the technical cost of fattening q  animals is given by the twice continuously differ-
entiable function ( ) :C q  [0, ) [0, )∞ → ∞ . There is a positive probability that a contagious 
disease affects the production unit. For simplicity we assume that if any animal becomes 
infected then all animals in the unit become infected. If infected, then the magnitude of 
loss per animal is δ . The probability that one animal does not become infected is 
(0,1]p∈ . Disease probabilities are independent across animals, an assumption we will 
revisit later. The probability that a lot of q  animals, each with the same p  value, does 
not become infected is , Ln( ) 0q qp e pη η= = ≤ .6   
Sorting by Health Classes 
Now consider two lots of animals where all animals are purchased in the feeder mar-
ket. The lots are comprised of mixed health classes. Lot I has 1
Iq  animals each with prob-
ability 1p  (of class 1p ) that it is healthy and 2
Iq  animals each with probability 
2 2 1,0p p p< < , that it is healthy. These probabilities are known to all, so that there are no 
information externalities. Lot II has 1
IIq  animals of class 1p  and 2
IIq  animals of class 2p . 
Let revenue per animal be R , while the value of each health class ip  animal is ( )iw p , 
called the feeder price-health schedule. We will solve for the value of ( )iw p  later. Ex-
pected profit aggregated over both lots is  
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
I I II II
I I II II I I II II
I I q q II II q q I II I II
R q q q q C q q C q q
q q p p q q p p q q w p q q w p
π δ
δ δ
= − + + + − + − +
+ + + + − + − +  (10) 
Define lot I as the high exposure lot if 1 2 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( )
I I II III I q q II II q q
I IIF q q p p q q p p F≡ + ≥ + ≡ . 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that I IIF F≥ . If 1Iq  increases by one and 2Iq  decreases 
by one, then the value of 1 2( )
I IC q q+  does not change while IF  increases in value. Obtain 
these animals by a unit decrease in 1
IIq  and a unit increase in 2
IIq  so that sums 1 1
I IIq q+  and 
2 2
I IIq q+  are preserved. Note that under the exchange, 
16 / Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen 
 
 
 1 2 2 1( / ) ( / ) .I II I II I IIF F F p p F p p F F+ → + > +  (11) 
This is because 2 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 2( )I II I II II IIF p F p F F p F p F p+ = − + + , 21 1 2( ) ( )I II I IIF F p F F p p− > − , 
2
1IIF p  
2
2 1 22II IIF p F p p+ > , and 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22 ( )II I II I IIF p p F F p p F p p F p p+ − = +  so that 
2 2
1 2I IIF p F p+ >  1 2 1 2I IIF p p F p p+ , where the last statement is equivalent to equation (11). 
The animal exchange increases profit because terms in equation (10) other than IF  and 
IIF  are invariant to the exchange. This notional animal exchange does not actually occur. 
Rather, growers recognize the inefficiency and never actually make the inappropriate 
placement. 
In general, and regardless of how many health classes exist or how many production-
fattening lots are under consideration, it can readily be shown that an exchange similar to 
that supporting inequality (11) always generates an increase in expected revenue for the 
same level of cost. This means that it is always efficient to exchange a lower-risk animal 
initially in a lower exposure lot for a higher-risk animal initially in a higher exposure lot. 
This process will continue until lots have become, as far as possible, sorted by health class. 
 
PROPOSITION 7.  If aggregate expected profit is maximized, then animals of two different 
health classes, say, 1p  and 2p  with 1 2p p≠ , can exist in, at most, one production lot. 
 
Kremer (1993) established the analogous result for formation of worker teams where team 
members have heterogeneous competencies, each contributing a single task to a project 
such that failure in one task means project failure.  
Unit Costs 
Henceforth we invoke Proposition 7 to assume that in-lot animals are of the same 
health class and we drop the health class notation. The unit cost of fattening is then  
( ) [ ( ) ](1 ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ); ( ) ; ( ) .
q q
qC q e C q q e C qU q A q S q A q S q e
q q
η η
ηδ δ δ+ + −= = + = = −  (12) 
Define ( )A q  as the unit technical cost and ( )S q  as the unit disease cost. For a lot with 
given p , lot size in competitive equilibrium will be chosen to minimize the average cost 
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of fattening a feeder animal. Were average cost not minimized then economic profits 
would be other than zero. Feeder animal price ( )w p  will satisfy ( ) min ( )qw p R U q= − , 
that is, it is the Ricardian rent. 
Incentive to Isolate 
If unit technical cost ( )A q  is constant, then unit cost of fattening is increasing in 
scale, that is, ( ) / 0qdU q dq e ηδη= − >  for 1p < .  
 
PROPOSITION 8.  If ( ) 0 [0, )A q q′ = ∀ ∈ ∞ , then optimum lot scale is 1q = . 
 
When ( )A q  is decreasing and convex, then ( )U q  is the sum of a decreasing, convex func-
tion and increasing, concave function ( )S q . One cannot be a priori sure that any local 
minimum is a global minimum. Even if ( )A q  is U-shaped (i.e., basin-shaped with interior 
minimum), one can only be sure that the minimizer of ( )U q is to the left of the minimizer 
of ( )A q . 
Figure 4 decomposes the unit cost function into unit technical cost and unit disease 
cost. Function ( )A q  is decreasing at 0q =  and convex on [0, )q∈ ∞  with interior mini-
mum. But when p  is comparatively low, then ( )U q  is increasing for low positive lot scale 
before peaking and assuming convex curvature at higher lot scale. As drawn, isolation 
minimizes unit cost. When p  is comparatively high, then ( )U q , as drawn, is decreasing at 
0q =  and convex on [0, )q∈ ∞  with interior minimum. There are many other forms that 
( )U q  might take. 
Interior Lot Scale 
In order to rule out the isolation lot scale solution, we assert two related requirements. 
Assumption 1. ( )U q  is strictly convex in q , that is, 2( ) [0, )qA q e qηδη′′ > ∀ ∈ ∞ . In addi-
tion, optimal solution *q  satisfies * 1q > . 
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FIGURE 4. Decomposition of unit cost function for fattening 
 
The convexity assumption ensures that any solution is a unique, global equilibrium. 
As we have already seen, the convexity condition is less likely to apply when p  is com-
paratively small. Upon differentiating, unit-cost-minimizing lot scale *q  is determined by  
 
**( ) .qA q e ηδη′ =  (13) 
Notice that the right-hand side is non-positive so that *( ) 0A q′ ≤ . Notice too that, as Fig-
ure 4 has already illustrated, when ( ) 0A q q +′′ ≥ ∀ ∈\  then both left-hand and right-hand 
sides of equation (13) are increasing in the choice argument and a unique solution is not 
assured. Relation (13) also allows for an interpretation of when convexity applies in the 
locality of an optimum. Inserting (13) into 
** 2( ) qA q e ηδη′′ >  generates * *( ) / ( )A q A q′′ ′  
Ln( )p<  so that the coefficient of relative curvature for unit technical costs is bounded 
from above by the natural log of the animal health class. The curvature bound becomes 
less demanding as p  increases. 
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Two interesting cross-derivatives are  
 
* *
2 * 2 *
* ( 1)( ) ( )(1 ) ; .q qd U q d U qq e e
dqdp dqd
η ηδ η ηδ
−= − + = −  (14) 
The first of these has the sign of *(1 )q η− + , while the second is positive.7 From Topkis’ 
(1995) theory of submodular cost functions, if Assumption 1 applies and the unique 
minimizing argument satisfies * 1/ Ln( )q p≤ −  then ( )U q  is submodular in q  and p  in 
the proximity of the unique optimizing lot scale.8 A small increase in p  shifts *q  right-
ward. If * 1/ Ln( )q p≥ −  then a small increase in p  shifts *q  leftward. Unit cost is also 
submodular in q  and δ− .  
 
PROPOSITION 9. Make Assumption 1. Then the unit-cost-minimizing lot scale is smaller in 
the presence of disease risk than absent disease risk (i.e., with 0η =  or 0δ = ). Unit-cost-
minimizing lot scale is decreasing in magnitude of disease loss. If * ( ) 1/ Ln( )q p≤ ≥ −  
then a small increase in herd animal health class leads to an increase (decrease) in opti-
mal lot scale. 
 
No matter how η  changes, though, *q  cannot exceed in value the solution to 
( ) 0A q′ = . An example is worthy of note.  
 
Example 1. Consider the negative exponential unit technical cost function 
0 1( )
qA q A A e λ−= + , 0 10, 0, 0A A λ≥ > > , so that 0Lim ( )q A q A→∞ =  and (13) solves as  
 * 11 Ln .Aq λλ η δη
 −=  +    (15) 
Absent disease considerations, that is, 0δη = , optimal lot scale would be unbounded. 
Because 1(0)A Aλ′ = −  and (0)S δη′ = − , inequality 1Ln[ /( )] 0Aλ δη− >  holds if and only 
if unit technical cost decreases at a more rapid rate at 0q =  than unit disease cost in-
20 / Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen 
 
 
creases at 0q = . Even if this were true, it is possible that ( ) ( ) 0A q S q′ ′+ ≠  for any posi-
tive finite value of q . This possibility is ruled out when ( )A q  is sufficiently convex, spe-
cifically, 0λ η+ > . If the value η  is sufficiently large (i.e., sufficiently close to 0) then 
1Ln[ /( )] 0Aλ δη− >  and 0λ η+ > , so that the unique solution is interior. 
Note that 2( ) qA q e ηδη′′ >  requires 2 21[1/( )] ( / )Ln A qλ η λ δη+ >  when 0λ η+ > . This 
bound on q  asserts that if there is an interior minimizer for ( )U q  then ( )U q  is not convex 
on all of q∈  [0, )∞ . Assumption 1 is not satisfied for the negative exponential technology, 
but it was unduly restrictive in any case. Unit cost is only convex on ˆ[0, ]q , qˆ ≡  
2 2 *
1[1/( )] ( / )Ln A q+ = +λ η λ δη  *[1/( )] ( / )Ln qλ η λ η+ − > . Convexity at *q  when *q  is 
the unique solution to * *( ) ( ) 0A q S q′ ′+ =  ensures that *q  is indeed the unique minimizer. 
At high values of q, unit cost must become concave because ( )U q  increases toward as-
ymptote 0A δ+ .  
From equation (15), * */ ( 1) /[( ) ]dq d qη η λ η η= − + +  and the derivative sign is as 
posited in Proposition 9. To verify that the derivative may take either sign, fix the value 
of * 1q η +  at zero and write * 11 [ Ln( / )] /[ ]q Aη λ η η λ δη λ η+ = + + − + . With /y λ η= −  
and 1 /Aκ δ= , then * 1 0q η + =  becomes 1 /ye yκ −= , a curve in parameter space. Slope is 
1 2/ ( 1) / 0yd dy y e yκ −= − >  because 1y > . Curvature satisfies 2 2/ signd dy =κ  2( 1)y −  
1 0+ > . If 1 /ye yκ −> , (1, )y∈ ∞ , then * 1 0q η + <  and lot scale decreases with an in-
crease in η , while if 1 /ye yκ −<  on (1, )y∈ ∞  then * 1 0q η + >  and lot scale increases 
with an increase in η . If one varies p  over (1, )y∈ ∞  such that 1yκ > , then *q  is mini-
mized when 1 /ye yκ −= . 
The situation is depicted in Figure 5. On the vertical axis at 1y =  then *Lim q− ↑η λ  
= ∞  so output can only decline as y  increases away from 1y = . But *0Lim qη− ↓ = ∞  
also, so that lot scale is only finite at intermediate health class values. On the vertical axis 
at 1y = , lot scale is unbounded to take advantage of increasing technical returns to scale 
when the magnitude of disease loss is acceptably low (i.e., κ  high). At high y , lot scale  
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FIGURE 5. Lot scale response to health class for negative exponential unit technical cost 
 
is unbounded because p  is sufficiently large that disease loss is again acceptably low at 
large lot scale.  
Feeder Animal Price 
The feeder animal price-health class schedule is the Ricardian rent  
 
**( ) ( ) .qw p R A q e ηδ δ= − − +  (16) 
In the case of Example 1, an explicit form can be obtained by direct substitution. In gen-
eral, the envelope theorem provides 
** ( 1)( ) / qdw p dp q e ηδ −=  so that  
 
* *
2 *
* * ( 2) * ( 2)
2
( ) ( 1) (1 ) .q qd w p dqq q e q e
dp d
η ηδ η δ η
− −= − + +  (17) 
Proposition 9 has shown that * *(1 ) / 0q dq dη η+ ≥  regardless of the sign of *1 q η+ . In 
addition, some work confirms that 
* *2 * * * ( -1) * 2( ) / [ ( ) ( )] /[ ( ) ]q qd w p dpd A q q A q e A q eη ηδ δη′′ ′ ′′= + − . 
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PROPOSITION 10. Make Assumption 1. Then schedule ( )w p  is convex in p . The schedule 
becomes more steeply increasing when the magnitude of disease loss increases (de-
creases) if * * *( ) / ( ) ( ) 1q A q A q′′ ′− > < .  
From Example 1, * * * 1( ) / ( ) [ /( )]Ln( / )q A q A q Aλ λ η λ δη′′ ′− = + − . With / 0.1η λ = − , 
then * * * 1 1( ) / ( ) (0.9) Ln(10 / ) ( ) 1q A q A q A δ−′′ ′− = > <  whenever 0.91 / ( ) 0.1 0.246A eδ > < = . 
This last number, being larger than / 0.1η λ− = , is consistent with positive output so that 
1 /A δ ∈  (0.1,0.246)  is possible and so is the peculiar circumstance that 2 ( ) /d w p dpdδ  
0< . 
Information and Bayesian Conditioning 
Quality of information will affect lot scale. To show how, let purchasers and sellers 
have symmetric but imperfect information on two animal types, as given in Table 4. If 
the animal has health class 1p  [with 1 1Ln( )p=η ] then the signal, say animal coat condi-
tion, is h with probability α . If the animal has class 2p , 2 1p p< , then the signal is h with 
probability β . If α  increases or β  decreases, then we say that the information structure 
has become more informative. The true fraction of class 1p  animals in the pool of feeder 
animals is (0,1)ρ ∈ . The signal-conditioned probabilities that an animal has class 1p  are  
 1 1
(1 )Prob( | ) ; Prob( | ) .
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )h l
p h r p l rρα ρ αρα ρ β ρ α ρ β
−= = = =+ − − + − −  (18) 
Following Proposition 7, the firm purchases only uniform-signal feeder animals. Write 
the i∈ { , }h l  signal lot exposure as 1 2(1 ) ( (1 ) )1 2i i i iqr q r q r rqp p qe η η− + −=  so that signal-conditioned 
unit costs are 
 
1 2
1 2
+(1 )( ; ) ( ) , ;
(1 )
(1 ) +(1 )(1 )( ; ) ( ) , .
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
h
l
qv
h h
qv
l l
U q v A q e v
U q v A q e v
ραη ρ βηδ δ ρα ρ β
ρ α η ρ β ηδ δ ρ α ρ β
−= + − = + −
− − −= + − = − + − −
 (19) 
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TABLE 4. Probabilities in detecting feeder animal health class 
Given that Signal is h Signal is l 
animals have health class 1p  α  1 α−  
animals have health class 2p  β  1 β−  
 
Note that h lv v>  if and only if 1 2( )( ) 0α β η η− − > , that is, α β> , and we make this as-
sumption.9 
With respective minimizing arguments in equation (19) as *hq  and 
*
lq , the envelope 
theorem yields 
 
*
*
* *
* 1 2
2
* *
* 2 1
2
( ; ) ( ; ) (1 ) ( ) 0;
[ (1 ) ]
( ; ) (1 ) ( ; ) (1 )(1 )( ) 0.
(1 ) [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
h h
l l
q vh h h h
h
q vl l l l
l
dU q v dU q v q e
d d
dU q v dU q v q e
d d
β ρ ρ β η ηδα α β ρα ρ β
β ρ ρ β η ηδα α β ρ α ρ β
− −= − = − ≤+ −
− − − −= − = − ≥− − + − −
 (20) 
Better quality information of either sort reduces unit cost for high-signal lots because the 
fraction of poor-health animals declines. By contrast, better information increases unit cost 
for low-signal lots. This is because the fraction of good-health animals declines upon im-
proved sorting in the marketplace. Referring to equation (16), the feeder price schedule 
difference *( ) ( ) [ ( ; )h lv v l lw e w e U q v− ≡  *( ; )]h hU q v−  should increase with better information. 
The finding in equation (20) conveys nothing about the role of information on lot 
scale. Consider the cross-derivatives  
 
2 * 2 *
* *
2 * 2 *
* *
( ; ) ( ; )(1 ); 1 ;
( ; ) ( ; )1 ; (1 ).
sign sign
h h h h
h h h h
sign sign
l l l l
l l l l
d U q v d U q vq v q v
d dq d dq
d U q v d U q vq v q v
d dq d dq
α β
α β
= − + = +
= + = − +
 (21) 
More information decreases (increases) the value of *( ; ) /h hdU q v dq  if 
*1 ( ) 0h hq v+ ≥ ≤  so 
that *hq  will shift rightward (leftward) upon the advent of better (symmetric) information. 
More information increases (decreases) the value of *( ; ) /l ldU q v dq  if 
*1 ( ) 0l lq v+ ≥ ≤  so 
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that *lq  will shift leftward (rightward) upon the advent of better information. Given the 
technology in Example 1, there always exists a hv  above which more information in-
creases scale *hq  and a lv  above which more information decreases scale *lq . 
 
PROPOSITION 11.  As the signal becomes slightly more informative (i.e., a small increase 
in α  or a small decrease in β ) then unit cost in high-signal lots decreases while unit 
cost in low-signal lots increases. If *1 ( ) 0h hq v+ ≥ ≤ , then an increase in signal informa-
tiveness increases (decreases) lot scale for high-signal lots. If *1 ( ) 0l lq v+ ≤ ≥ , then an 
increase in signal informativeness increases (decreases) lot scale for low-signal lots. 
 
Given 0 h lv v≥ > , Example 1 shows that it is not inconsistent for *1 h hq v+  and 
*1 l lq v+  to have different signs. Varying the value of y  for a given κ  value in Figure 5, 
the possibilities are * *sign(1 ,1 ) {( , ), ( , ), ( , )}h h l lq v q v+ + ∈ − − + − + + . If * *sign(1 ,1 )h h l lq v q v+ +  
( , )= + +  then more information increases the gap between lot scales: apply Proposition 9, 
remembering that h lv v>  and / 0 /h ldv d dv dα α> > . High-signal lots become even lar-
ger while low-signal lots become even smaller. If * *sign(1 ,1 ) ( , )h h l lq v q v+ + = − −  then lot 
scales also diverge, but now low-signal lots become larger and high-signal lots become 
smaller. The case of ( , )+ −  is ambiguous. 
Dependent Disease Risks 
To this point we have assumed that the health probabilities for animals in a given lot 
are independent. We relax this assumption by allowing for idiosyncratic and systemic com-
ponents to an animal’s health probabilities. The probability that one animal does not be-
come infected, (0,1]p∈ , is decomposed into a systemic component ν  and an independent 
idiosyncratic component ϕ , p νϕ= . The relative sizes of the multiplied probabilities may 
be viewed as being determined by the degree of similarity in backgrounds of the lot ani-
mals; if very similar, then ν  is low and ϕ  is high for a given value of p .  
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At a specified value of p , primary disease source risk is said to be fixed. For sys-
temic component ν , one cannot attribute disease risk to any particular animal. The sys-
temic components are perfectly correlated across the lot while the idiosyncratic 
components are independent. The probability that the lot does not become infected is then 
1 ( 1)q q qp pe ϑνϕ ϕ − −= = , Ln( )ϑ ϕ= .10 As ϕ  increases then animals at a given health class 
p  become more similar in the sense that most of the risk falls on common component 
ν .11 The envelope theorem suggests that unit cost is decreasing in ϑ  for a given value of 
p , 
** * ( 1)( ) / ( 1) qdU q d p q e ϑϑ δ −= − −  0≤  under Assumption 1. In addition, equation (13) 
becomes 
** ( 1)( ) qA q p e ϑδϑ −′ =  so that  
 
*
* *
( 1)
* *
1 ( 1) .
( ) ( )
qdq q p e
d A q A q
ϑϑ δϑ ϑ
−+ −= ′′ ′−  (22) 
The numerator and denominator are both assuredly positive under Assumption 1 when-
ever ϑ  is sufficiently close to 0. 
 
PROPOSITION 12.  Make Assumption 1 and fix health class p . Unit cost decreases with an 
increase in ϕ . For ϕ  that are sufficiently large, optimal lot scale increases with an in-
crease in ϕ . 
 
Proposition 12 suggests that one should procure feeder stock from as similar a back-
ground, be it in nature or nurture, as possible. Livestock auctions are unlikely to perform 
well in that regard. Closed-system feeder stock procurement from a single-feeder animal 
source would perform better. 
Damage Control 
To model expenditures on controlling loss, let control input level x  per animal be 
used at unit cost t . The input reduces loss in that δ  is a decreasing function, ( ) 0xδ ′ ≤ . 
Then equation (12) becomes  
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .qU q x A q x x e txηδ δ= + − +  (23) 
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Second cross-derivatives are 2 ( ) / ( ) 0qd U dqdx x e ηδ η′⋅ = − ≤ , 2 ( ) / ( ) 0d U dqd t⋅ − =  and 
2 ( ) / ( ) 1 0d U dxd t⋅ − = − ≤ .12 The system is submodular in argument set { , , }x q t− . Stan-
dard deductions from submodularity theory support the intuition that an increase in the 
price of the control input decreases both input use per animal and lot scale. 
Internal Production 
Suppose one could produce internally such that there is zero probability of disease. 
Let ** arg min ( )q A q=  and write **( )fec A q=  in the notation of the earlier model. Then 
the critical health class for external procurement is the solution to feR c R− = −δ  
**( ) qA q e− + ηδ . If the external procurement p  value satisfies ˆp p< , where pˆ =  
** 1/[( ( ) ) / ] qfeA q c+ −δ δ , then one should produce internally rather than buy feeder ani-
mals. 
Closing the Model 
When there is only one health class and N  firms then the market equilibrium level 
of N , labeled *N , and the equilibrium level of p , labeled *p , can be determined as fol-
lows. Write Q Nq=  as the market supply of feeder animals and * * *Q N q=  as the equi-
librium market supply. The inverse demand function for fat animals is then ( )R Q  
( )R Nq= . Write market cost of supplying Q  feeder animals at health class p  as 
( , )H Q p  with ( ) / 0dH dQ⋅ ≥  and ( ) / 0dH dp⋅ ≥ . Then, from equation (16), 
* *( ) ( )w p R Q=  ** * * *( ) ( ) ( , ) /qA q p dH Q p dQ− − + =δ δ  while * *( ) /Q dw p dp  
* *( , ) /dH Q p dp= . These, together with equation (13), solve for *p , *Q , *q , and so *N . 
It is unlikely, however, that any system solution is unique. The likely convexity of ( )w p , 
as demonstrated in Proposition 10, is one reason for this. 
 
Openness and Communicable Animal Diseases 
To illustrate the role of openness in disease management, we consider efforts to con-
trol three categories of communicable animal disease. These are babesiasis (Texas fever) 
in bovines, tuberculosis (TB) in bovines, and respiratory diseases in swine. The first is 
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tick-borne, most problematic in warmer climates, and of little health risk to humans. TB 
is bacterial, more difficult to detect when trading animals, and presents significant human 
health risks. The most troublesome swine respiratory diseases are viral diseases, which 
are often readily transmitted by air and do not pose significant human health risks. Each 
has somewhat distinct features regarding transmission and economic impacts. 
Babesiasis 
The ailment causes fever, jaundice, a decline in milk production, and abortion. It was 
a very serious threat to beef productivity from 1850 to 1890 in the U.S. Southwest and 
Great Plains. At that time, Texas grown cattle were herded north to railheads for slaugh-
ter in the Midwest as well as for the feeder trade in the Midwest and Great Plains. Home-
steaders in Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and elsewhere suffered large losses through 
trampled crops, babesiasis, and rowdy cowboys. Similar to legislation elsewhere, in 1859 
the Kansas Territorial Legislature prohibited the droving of sick cattle into the state and a 
quarantine law (no droving of any cattle into the state between April and November) fol-
lowed in 1861. The legislation was ineffective and largely ignored. 
In 1867 the Kansas state legislature imposed an east-to-west quarantine line within 
the state (Hutson 1994). The line shifted several times before the trade petered out. The 
risk of babesiasis was considered by progressive ranchers in the state to be a major deter-
rent to investing in herd quality enhancement. Even away from trails, Texas strays min-
gled with herds on open range and through broken fences. It was clear to most in the 
Kansas cattle industry by the late 1880s that the need to protect their own herd far out-
weighed gains from the Texas trade, and more stringent statewide quarantine laws were 
enforced. Similar events occurred in other states and effectively ended U.S. cattle trail 
droving. 
The disease, though much diminished, remained a problem in Kansas until about 
1930. The spatial externalities caused by babesiasis were among the major motives for 
setting up the USDA’s Bureau of Animal Industry in 1884. The disease also provided the 
Bureau with one of its first successes when Bureau scientists proved the disease was tick-
borne. In 1892, the federal government imposed a national quarantine line above which 
any southern cattle moved between January 15 and November 15 had to be by rail or boat 
and for immediate slaughter. 
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Bovine Tuberculosis 
Unlike babesiasis, bovine TB is communicable to humans, and that fact was a deter-
mining issue in prioritizing the disease for eradication. Among cattle, it can be spread 
through bacterial contamination of water, bedding, feed, and shared air. Productivity 
losses typically amount to a 10 to 25 percent reduction in output from infected animals. 
At the herd level, the disease generally spreads through stock purchases, although herd 
contiguity (i.e., density of production), a common water supply, and wildlife vectors are 
also factors. Commencing in 1917, large resources were devoted by the U.S. government 
to eradicate the disease in bovines. Measures included a testing program, quarantine for 
animals entering the country, and movement controls on animals inside the United States, 
as well as a tracking system for moved animals (Smith 1958; Myers and Steele 1969). 
Test positive animals were destroyed, and this number peaked at 377,000 in 1935.  
The early focus of the campaign was on breeding herds, in part because of the mobility 
of high-quality progeny. Breeding herds declared as TB-free were designated as accredited. 
Accreditation was later extended to counties, and a market premium for live animals from 
these herds and counties provided private incentives beyond direct productivity effects to 
secure accreditation. State-level legislation required out-of-state animals to pass tests before 
they were allowed entry. In-state testing regimes were put in place, reactors were slaugh-
tered with compensation, and herds with reactors were quarantined pending subsequent 
tests. Opposition among some farmers was intense, indicating the gap between private and 
public benefits. The program is viewed as a great success and all counties in the United 
States had infection rates below 0.5 percent by 1941. Even ignoring the reduction of bovine 
TB infections in the human population, it was held that the program benefits far exceeded 
program costs in securing agricultural productivity.13  
It was recognized early in federal animal disease eradication endeavors that system 
closure through movement control was critical. The bovine TB program illustrates two 
related central themes in the approach generally taken: imposing movement controls and 
designing robust information systems. Movement controls and information systems are to 
some extent substitutes. Broad movement controls may be necessary if the extent of a 
disease is known with a low degree of certainty. But the resulting cost would be high 
when there are strong private incentives to move animals. A good information system 
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may allow for targeted movement controls at low cost. The most important feature of an 
information system is the quality of testing procedures, and a TB test (though imperfect) 
for use on farms became available in 1892 (Myers and Steele 1969). 
Swine Respiratory Diseases 
Many swine diseases are contagious but transferable only by direct animal contact, 
as in our intra-farm model. The movement of animals between herds is an important con-
dition for the spread of these diseases. But gains from trade are forgone when limits are 
placed on animal movements, while losses from restricting breeding selection are also 
important. Many breeding farms have moved to closed systems, while fattening farms 
remain relatively open (Plonait 2001). The introduction of new genetic material in breed-
ing farms occurs by means of artificial insemination, embryo-transfers, and pre-natal har-
vest of piglets to ensure specified pathogen-free animals. 
Besides the transmission of infection from other the animals, infections may occur 
through manure spread on land, wild animals, feed, and human contact. Aerial transmis-
sion is important for certain viral infections. Several costly respiratory diseases in swine 
illustrate the issues we have discussed; See Table 5.14 Enzootic pneumonia (EP) can take 
a subclinical form up to an acute form with significant economic losses to the farm. It is 
often caused by the introduction of new animals in existing herds. EP can also be trans-
ferred at a distance in aerosol. This mode of transmission is highly dependent on farm 
and regional stocking density. Actinobacillus-pleuropneumonia, first discovered in 1964, 
is similar to EP. Infection mostly occurs by buying new animals but also through passive 
infection by clothing and airborne transmission. Its chronic form is often present in fat-
tening farms and closed breeder-fattening systems. 
Swine influenza has been endemic in the United States since it was first observed in 
1918. Its later emergence in East Asia, South America, and Europe was likely through 
imported breeding pigs. It is introduced by the purchase of latent infected animals, but 
outbreaks usually occur only under adverse weather conditions. Porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome is viral and was first reported in 1987 in the United States. The first 
European outbreak occurred in 1990 in Germany, and from there it spread rapidly 
throughout Europe (Nodelijk et al. 2003). 
  
TABLE 5. Some important respiratory diseases in swine 
Disease Incubation Time Effects Morbidity Mortality Age Classes 
Enzootic pneumonia 
– acute 
Up to 3 weeks Some coughing and weak-
ened general condition 
60% Up to 10% All 
Enzootic pneumonia 
– chronic 
Not applicable Few observable impacts 80% Chronic 3 weeks to 6 
months 
Pleuropneunomia 
– acute 
2-5 days Strong impact on general 
condition with severe respi-
ratory symptoms 
80% Up to 50% All 
Pleuropneunomia 
– chronic 
Not applicable Some symptoms, including 
coughing 
30% Chronic Weaner and 
feeder pigs 
Swine Influenza 1-2 days Strong impact on general 
condition with severe respi-
ratory symptoms 
Up to 100% 2-3% All but pig-
lets 
Pseudorabies Up to 20 days Strong impact on general 
condition. Apathy, some 
coughing and respiratory 
problems 
Up to 100% Up to 10% Weaner pigs 
Porcine reproductive 
and respiratory  
syndrome 
Up to 10 days Strong impact on general 
condition, including abor-
tion and severe respiratory 
symptoms 
Up to 100% Up to 10% Fattening 
and breeding 
pigs 
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These diseases are most problematic in areas of dense swine populations. Veterinarians 
and animal scientists advocate that commercial production should occur in, as far as is 
practicable, closed systems. For small swine production units it is often difficult to im-
plement a completely closed system because genetic upgrading requires the introduction 
of purchased stock. An industrial system, on the other hand, generally involves closer 
coordination to protect against disease. However, industrial systems need to recognize 
their disease vulnerability due to their larger scale. Many large-scale growers have 
adopted all-in/all-out systems, together with routine pharmaceutical prevention pro-
grams.15 
 
Concluding Comments 
In this article, we have identified some ways in which the extent of openness in an 
animal production system can affect system performance. Closed systems that forgo po-
tential gains from trade can be more efficient when the risk of losses from communicable 
disease is significant. When communicable disease gives rise to inter-farm externalities, 
then temporary (at the least) public action to close the system may be necessary to im-
prove industry performance. Indeed, to the extent that regional advantages in feed costs 
encourage feeder trade, our first model suggests that cheap feed may reduce competitive-
ness for the system as a whole. If advantage is to be taken of cheap feed, then the rela-
tively closed contractual approach adopted among U.S. hogs may perform better than the 
more open feeder cattle trade approach even when price discovery is impeded. 
Our model of intra-farm effects showed how communicable disease considerations 
impede exploitation of technical economies of scale. The relationship between health 
class and scale may not be simple. However, the reasonableness of the negative exponen-
tial technology suggests that when health class is sufficiently large then scale should in-
crease with improved health class. It should not be surprising that industrial approaches 
to animal production, with high fixed cost capital requirements and scale economies, 
place emphasis on procuring animals of consistently superior health. Optimal lot scale 
may not otherwise be sufficiently large to clear a profit. 
A common thread running through the analysis is the relevance of information in 
improving performance. Openness and information can hardly be considered separately. 
If traditional open approaches to animal production are to remain competitive then the 
  
genuine information problems attending open systems must be solved. If a production 
system is to exploit the potential advantages of trade then comprehensive animal informa-
tion infrastructure will be necessary. Indeed, plural information sets may be required. 
Governments need information to manage animal and human health externalities. Pro-
ducers and processors have additional information needs that are unlikely to be met by 
any government endeavors. Record keeping can be burdensome, so any government sys-
tem should be capable of extension to accommodate private sector needs.
  
Endnotes 
1. Sumner (2003) explains in depth the public good aspects of agricultural diseases. 
2. A notable exception is Kuchler and Hamm (2000), in which the issue is a bounty on 
reporting scrapie infections. 
3. See Biggs (1985) on practical motivation for these monotonicity assumptions. No-
tice that our model has trivial spatial structure in that all production in the market is 
equally exposed to any given disease outbreak. Even so, the classical Reed-Frost 
algorithm for disease contagion is not spatial either (Thrusfield 1995). While more 
spatial structure would be critical in any epidemiological model seeking prediction, 
it is less relevant to a qualitative economic analysis of contagion. A significant defi-
ciency in our model is that system openness is attached to a production function. 
But if a disease can be eradicated then an open system can have low disease inci-
dence. Even then, the more open the system, the greater the risk of a subsequent 
outbreak. 
4. This means that [ ]M I  is not flat in metric space neighborhoods. Our analysis could 
include such situations, but no additional insights would result. 
5. They are unstable to a perturbance in one direction, i.e., either unstable when I  
increases or unstable when I  decreases. 
6. While we use calculus to optimize, it is recognized that lot scale takes integer val-
ues. Exponential transformation q qp e η=  will facilitate analysis later in the section. 
7. Condition * 1q η ≥ −  (i.e., * 1qp e−≥ ) asserts the lot is diseased with probability of at 
least 0.368. 
8. In this case, submodular means that 2 ( ) / 0d U q dqdp ≤ . On these methods in com-
parative statics, see Topkis 1995 or Milgrom and Shannon 1994. 
9. If α β< , then re-label α  as β  and β  as α . If α β= , then the signal bears no 
information. 
  
10.  If the lot consists of two animals, then there is probability 1 ν−  that both succumb 
to a common cause. For each animal also, there is the probability 1 ϕ−  that the par-
ticular animal succumbs to an idiosyncratic cause and then contaminates the other. 
The three events are independent and the probability that none occur is 2 pνϕ ϕ= . 
11. Caution is warranted when interpreting systemic risk in this model. As the value of 
ν  decreases, animals become more similar in risk exposure but lot systemic risk 
decreases. 
12. The expression 2 ( ) / 0d U dqdx⋅ ≤  suggests that farm-level conditions under which 
lot scale is high should also tend to be conditions under which x  is high. A survey 
by APHIS (2000) found that large cattle feedlots (≥  8,000 head) spent an average 
of $16.26 per sick animal on (often communicable) respiratory diseases, compared 
with an average of $11.09 per sick animal in smaller feedlots (<  8,000 head but ≥  
1,000 head). For digestive problems (excluding non-eaters) costs per sick animal 
were about the same: $6.27 on large lots and $6.14 on smaller lots. For problems of 
the central nervous system problems, large lots spent $11.29 per sick animal while 
smaller lots spent $11.61 per sick animal. 
13.  See p. 134 of Myers and Steele 1969.  
14. The descriptions are largely from information in Zimmermann and Plonait 2001. 
15. All-in/all-out management means that all animals are removed from a lot prior to 
restocking. The facilities are then cleaned and disinfected before restocking occurs. 
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